Let Them Tank: Introducing the Tank Tax
The issue of tanking in basketball has been around in some form since the inception of the modern draft. After all, NBA basketball is the best example of a strong link sport because a team has to have one of the ten best players in the league to be a legitimate championship contender. Exceptions to this rule are very rare. Teams aren’t able to utilize weak link strategies that competitive teams in other sports use like maximizing depth and balance or exploiting advantages connected to randomness to overcome the absence of an elite, foundational talent on the roster. As a result, tanking becomes a much more attractive option. The idea behind this is that teams that are without a top ten level player have a better chance of landing someone that can develop into this kind of a player by simply losing a lot of games and picking at the top of the draft. The NBA has since implemented a series of rules to try to steer teams away from this strategy. Starting with the 2019 NBA Draft, the lottery odds were smoothed down to the point where the worst teams now only have a 14% chance of landing the top pick, whereas the odds were originally set at 25% in previous seasons. Also, the league introduced a play-in tournament for the seventh and eighth seeds to try to keep more teams involved in the playoff hunt. In addition to this, the league changed the player resting rules to deter teams from having healthy players sit out of games for a prolonged period of time. For the most part, these changes have achieved the desired results. More teams have chosen to stay competitive throughout the season while the race to the bottom has been minimized to the point where only a handful of teams are choosing to jockey for draft position. These rule changes have helped to put the issue of tanking on the back burner in a normal season. However, NBA commissioner, Adam Silver has stated that the NBA is monitoring tanking, as it has become a more serious issue because this particular season is not going to be a normal one due to the looming presence of Victor Wembanyama.
Wembanyama cemented his status as one of the most tantalizing and talented draft prospects of all-time with his play in the LNB Pro A league in France combined with his stellar performance over two games in an exhibition series against the G-League Ignite in Las Vegas in early October. In those games, Wembanyama displayed a fluid level of athleticism, coordination, and skill level that has never been seen before from a player that is at least 7’4” or possibly even 7’5”. He scored 73 points over the two games, which were played under NBA rules, and he showcased an ability to threaten defenses at all three levels. Around the rim, he relied on his explosive leaping ability and extraordinary 8’0” wingspan to catch high lobs and dunk on defenders. He also has outstanding footwork that allows him to execute advanced post moves to make tough shots from mid-range. On top of this, he showcased great ball handling skills, sound shooting mechanics, and deep range because he made half of his threes in a variety of ways. He also impacted the game in other areas. Defensively, he displayed elite rim protecting potential because he’s an extremely rangy athlete that covers a ton of ground, so he easily rotated inside to block a lot of shots from the weak side. Additionally, he has great lateral mobility that allows him to effectively defend smaller players in space and use his long wingspan to play passing lanes to get deflections or steals. He also uses his excellent vertical athleticism to pluck rebounds out of the air on both ends, and his court vision is improving to the point where he has become a good passing big man. This complete package has just not been seen before in the modern history of the league. Many draft analysts have indicated that Wembanyama is the best prospect to come out since LeBron James in 2003. This has sparked rumors that non-contending teams are very likely to tank at unprecedented levels in an attempt to try to land the opportunity to select Wembanyama in this upcoming draft. The reforms that have been instituted are probably going to be ineffective in this draft cycle. No matter how much Adam Silver pleads for teams to stay competitive, they are unlikely to resist the temptation of engaging in the necessary tanking process to potentially land a game changing prospect that could drastically transform the fortunes of their franchise. The question from here is if there’s a way to possibly discourage teams from tanking when a generational talent like Wembanyama is entering the draft. The answer to this question is that there isn’t a way to stop teams from tanking in this situation because superstar, championship level, impact players are scarce and as long as that is the case, teams will do what is necessary to acquire one, even if it means losing on a grand scale.
If tanking in some form is unavoidable, then it would make more sense for the league to accept the reality of the situation and figure out to minimize it to a point where it’s only a temporary occurrence rather than a systemic behavior. In order to prevent teams from staying at the bottom for a prolonged period of time, another rule needs to be implemented to serve as a deterrent. If we look to the other sports, Major League Baseball recently instituted a series of changes to its draft process, with the most intriguing rule being a repeater penalty for qualifying for the lottery in multiple seasons. This rule is potentially applicable in the NBA because it would discourage the practice of being bad over many seasons, as it would take away the primary reward. However, this rule doesn’t really separate the intent of tanking from a typical form of organizational incompetence. To put a repeater lottery penalty rule in place in the NBA, it would be necessary to establish the intent of the organization in a possible tank scenario. With that in mind, my amendment would be to include a repeater penalty as a part of a larger rule that forces teams to establish their intent when it comes to a possible race to the bottom. Essentially, my solution wouldn’t necessarily be to stop tanking, but to instead make it work in the league’s favor by establishing a Tank Tax that teams could pay that would allow them to tank without repercussions in the short-term while preventing them from doing so in future seasons.
In a general sense, the way that this Tank Tax would work is that a team would pay the league a fee in the form of money and sometimes draft picks if they wanted to establish the intent that they are tanking. The reason that they would need to establish their intent is that paying the Tank Tax would allow a team to boost its odds of landing a top pick beyond what is already established by the current rules. In return, the league basically looks the other way in regards of a team’s tanking, and even puts in extra roster flexibility mechanisms to provide tanking assistance, as long as the team understands that they would be subject to a repeater penalty that locks them out of the top picks for a certain number of seasons, depending on the amount of tax that they chose to pay. It seems counter-intuitive to dangle a reward for losing on a grand scale. However, the goal of implementing this Tank Tax is to prevent systemic tanking over multiple seasons. Even if a team actually accomplishes its goal of getting the first pick by tanking and paying the tax, the repeater penalties would force them to try to win in future years because they wouldn’t really be able to participate in the lottery afterwards. Also, the consequences for an unsuccessful tank would be severe enough that it would make teams think twice before doing so, as they could mortgage away their future by not being able to access the top picks in the draft. In addition to this, it would indirectly reward the teams that chose not to tank because their lottery odds would incrementally improve by taking the tank teams away from the lottery equation in future years, as part of the repeater penalties. This is more or less how the Tank Tax would work. If things are still uncertain, you will get a better idea when I go over the specific elements of the tax and how it would be implemented.
To start off, there would be three different levels to the Tank Tax. The first level would be the Standard Tank Tax and it would work as follows.
· The team would pay a fee that is equal to 15% of the cap and it would go into a Tank Pool that would get re-distributed to the non-tanking teams in the form of cash and a Trade Exception if the pool is large enough.
· By paying the Standard Tank Tax, the team would not be subject to fines related to tanking. Also, they will receive an increase in their lottery odds if they finish with one of the league’s two worst records. The odds increase would be 5% if they have the worst record and 2.5% if they finish with the second worst record.
· The league would also allow the team to loan out two players to other teams in the form of a Rental Trade. Rental Trades would work as follows. First off, only non-tanking teams can acquire a player in a Rental Trade. From there, any player that has a salary equal or lower than 15% of the cap could be dealt to another team like a typical trade. Then, at the end of the season, they would be automatically returned to their original team. For a player that has a salary above 15% of the cap, their Rental Trade value would be set at either 15% or half their salary, whichever is higher. Any non-tanking team can trade for this loaned out player at the Rental Trade value. At the end of the season, the player can choose to either go back to their original team or stay with their new team. If they choose to leave their original team, then the new team has to compensate the original team for the remainder of the player’s salary.
· If a team chooses to pay the Standard Tank Tax, their first round pick cannot land in either of the top two spots for the next two drafts. They would also receive a Tank Team label for the next two seasons, so they would not be allowed to receive any potential rewards that are given to non-tanking teams.
The Standard Tank Tax might work for some teams, but if others think that this leaves too much to chance, they could boost their odds even more by paying a higher tax in the form of the Super-Tank Tax. It’s similar to the Standard Tank Tax, but there are some noticeable differences.
· The fee for the Super-Tank Tax would be set at 30% of the cap instead of 15%, and they would have to relinquish one future first round pick that will be redistributed to a non-tanking team by way of an equal chance lottery.
· The team’s odds would be doubled from 14% to 28% for only the first overall pick if they finish with the worst record. After the first pick, the team would be subject to normal lottery rules, so their odds do not increase for second through fourth picks in the draft.
· The team would be allowed to loan out three players instead of two and the Rental Trades would work the same way as they do when paying the Standard Tank Tax.
· If a team pays the Super-Tank Tax, their first round pick cannot land in the either of the first three spots for the next four drafts. They would then get the Tank Team label for the next four seasons, so they would be unable to receive any potential rewards that are given to non-tanking teams in that time.
This is basically how the first two levels of the tax work. In essence, a team pays the tax to boost their odds of landing the top pick. However, if a team wants to leave nothing to chance and do whatever it takes to land an opportunity to select a generational talent in the next draft, they would have the option to push every chip into the middle of the table and go all-in by paying the Mega-Tank Tax. This level of the Tank Tax would work as follows.
· The Mega-Tank Tax fee would be set at 50% of the cap. They would also have to give up two future first round picks that would be redistributed to the non-tanking teams in separate equal chance lotteries.
· By paying the Mega-Tank Tax, a team could bypass the lottery to acquire the first overall pick outright only if they finish with the league’s worst record. After the first pick, they would be subject to normal lottery rules, so there are no improved odds for the second, third, or fourth picks.
· The team would be allowed to loan out an unlimited number of players. The Rental Trade rules would remain the same, but every player that is loaned out gets the choice to either return to their original team or stay with their new team. If a player has a salary above 15% of the cap and they choose to leave their original team at the end of the season, the process would be the same as it was described in the Standard Tank Tax. If a player has a salary below 15% of the cap and they decide to leave their original team, the new team just has to give the original team the next available second round pick. Then, the original team would also receive a Trade Exception for the value of the player’s salary.
· As part of the agreement for paying the Mega-Tank Tax, the team’s first round pick would not be allowed to land in either of the top four spots for the next six drafts. Also, they would get the Tank Team label in that six-year period, so they would be locked out of receiving any potential benefits that are available to non-tanking teams.
These are the specifics of the Tank Tax. In general, the idea behind this is that trying to stop the practice of tanking at all costs is a futile enterprise. Instead, the Tank Tax would turn the decision to tank into a more definitive risk-reward proposition that has more serious future consequences than they do now. The current rules do it make tougher to receive a top pick, but there aren’t really any real risks involved if a team tries to tank and misses. Right now, if teams don’t land in their desired draft slot, they can simply bottom out again, go back into the lottery, and try again. The addition of a Tank Tax would change the decision-making process considerably, especially in situations where a super-prospect like Wembanyama becomes available in the draft. Tanking for this kind of a player is not something that is usually done in isolation. If one team entertains the idea of overtly tanking, then it’s likely that several other teams are engaging in the same thought process because superstars with transformational talent are exceedingly scarce and extremely valuable. As a result, the teams that don’t have this kind of player on their roster will do anything to acquire one, even if it means losing a lot of games. The Tank Tax would play on this idea of scarcity to make aggressive tanking a much riskier option than it is right now. After all, only one team can have the first overall pick. Even if one team reaps the rewards of receiving that first pick, every tanking team still has to face some repercussions if they elected to pay the tax. By defining the price, it might make some teams think twice before considering the tactic of tanking because if the tank fails and they don’t land the desired pick, then it would come at a significant cost. Teams would have to really think out their strategy when it comes to racing to the bottom to pursue a top pick. Some teams might only focus on the potential reward, and they would still look to tank aggressively. Others might see the cost or consider the long-term ramifications and they might hesitate or reconsider their actions. It is in this way that the Tank Tax could end up being a stronger deterrent for tanking. Essentially, it would take the idea that teams will do anything to gain an edge and flip it on its head by making teams pay a price for actively chasing the reward of getting the top pick. In doing so, it would incentivize teams that play it straight by choosing to not go for the extra edge because the tanking teams would be locked out of high draft picks in the subsequent years. This idea is a radical one, but it might be the optimal way to at least slow down tanking. The truth is that tanking really is not something that can be eliminated, especially in a strong-link sport like NBA basketball. Instead the league should rethink their strategy by create consequences that could make tanking a less viable tactic. This hypothetical Tank Tax would do just that. It would allow teams to fulfill their wishes of a landing a top prospect, but they would have to be careful about what they wish for because the reward would come at a cost. The only question then would be if that price is worth paying. There’s no definitive answer to that question, but if teams are forced to ask it more frequently, then tanking might happen less often, and the NBA could be more competitive in the process. It’s backwards thinking, but in order to stop teams from intentionally sliding backward, this might be the only way for the league to move forward.